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AbstrACt
Objectives Out-of-pocket (OOP) payment for modern 
contraception is an understudied component of healthcare 
financing in countries like Kenya, where wealth gradients 
in met need have prompted efforts to expand access to 
free contraception. This study aims to examine whether, 
among public sector providers, the poor are more likely 
to receive free contraception and to compare how OOP 
payment for injectables and implants—two popular 
methods—differs by public/private provider type and 
user’s sociodemographic characteristics.
Design, setting and participants Secondary analyses 
of nationally representative, cross-sectional household 
data from the 2014 Kenya Demographic and Health 
Survey. Respondents were women of reproductive age 
(15–49 years). The sample comprised 5717 current 
modern contraception users, including 2691 injectable 
and 1073 implant users with non-missing expenditure 
values.
Main outcome Respondent’s self-reported source and 
payment to obtain their current modern contraceptive 
method.
Methods We used multivariable logistic regression to 
examine predictors of free public sector contraception 
and compared average expenditure for injectable and 
implant. Quintile ratios examined progressivity of non-zero 
expenditure by wealth.
results Half of public sector users reported free 
contraception; this varied considerably by method and 
region. Users of implants, condoms, pills and intrauterine 
devices were all more likely to report receiving their 
method for free (p<0.001) compared with injectable users. 
The poorest were as likely to pay for contraception as the 
wealthiest users at public providers (OR: 1.10, 95% CI: 
0.64 to 1.91). Across all providers, among users with non-
zero expenditure, injectable and implant users reported 
a mean OOP payment of Kenyan shillings (KES) 80 
(US$0.91), 95% CI: KES 78 to 82 and KES 378 (US$4.31), 
95% CI: KES 327 to 429, respectively. In the public sector, 
expenditure was pro-poor for injectable users yet weakly 
pro-rich for implant users.
Conclusions More attention is needed to targeting 
subsidies to the poorest and ensuring government facilities 
are equipped to cope with lost user fee revenue.
bACkgrOunD 
Achieving Universal Health Coverage—
including for family planning (FP) services—
demands attention to financial protection. 
Consideration of user fees is particularly 
important in countries like Kenya, where 
out-of-pocket (OOP) payments form a substan-
tial proportion of healthcare financing.1 2 In 
Kenya, unmet need for FP is highest among 
the poor, with a documented 8–14 percentage 
point increase in modern contraception use 
with each increase in household wealth quin-
tile.3 A study in Kenya and India found that 
poor households spend a significantly higher 
proportion of their income on reproductive 
healthcare (including FP), with the poorest 
households in Kenya spending 10 times the 
proportion spent by the least poor.4 Many 
government financial protection policies 
focus on inpatient events where healthcare 
expenditure is likely to be catastrophic, yet the 
greater frequency of outpatient expenses—
including for contraceptive services, which 
affect women in particular—can also push 
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► A major strength of the study is that it is the first to 
our knowledge to use nationally representative data 
from a low-income country to examine out-of-pock-
et payment for modern contraception.
 ► Another strength is the transparency in the clas-
sification of family planning providers, handling of 
outliers and appropriate adjustments for complex 
survey design.
 ► One limitation of the study is the reliance on self-re-
ported cost data from current users of modern 
contraception and the inability to compare this with 
costs to women who discontinued or eschewed use 
of modern contraception.
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households into poverty5 or reduce care-seeking among 
the poor.3 6 
A systematic review on the relationship between user 
fees and FP use in low-income and middle-income coun-
tries (LMICs) was inconclusive, although some included 
studies suggested that young people and the poor were 
more sensitive to price increases than wealthier or less 
marginalised groups.7 Cost is rarely cited as the reason for 
non-use of modern contraception among women in need 
(those wishing to delay or avoid pregnancy) in Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys (DHS).8 9 Yet, focus groups in 
Nyanza Province, Kenya found that the poor identify high 
cost of services as a barrier to FP care, both in opportu-
nity costs associated with seeking care and direct fees for 
services,3 suggesting that for some individuals, cost can 
impact FP access.
Kenya has used various financing mechanisms to 
support increased access to FP and reproductive health 
services.3 10 A 2004 policy, commonly known as the ‘10/20 
policy’, abolished user fees in primary care facilities; 
instead government dispensaries and health centres were 
allowed to charge a registration fee of 10 or 20 Kenyan 
shillings (KES) (approximately US$0.11 and US$0.23), 
with the poor exempted from payment.11 12 Public hospi-
tals could continue charging fees to users under a cost 
sharing policy. Yet fee waiver implementation and iden-
tification of eligible individuals was left to the discretion 
of actors at the community and facility level. Despite the 
10/20 policy, many FP clients in government facilities 
reported paying additional ‘hidden fees’ for the consul-
tation, medical tests or equipment and the contracep-
tive commodity.3 A 2010 health facility survey found that 
approximately 70% of government facilities providing FP 
charged user fees for services.13 A 2009 study found low 
community knowledge of the 10/20 policy and qualifying 
exemptions.11 However, as of June 2013, all fees at public 
outpatient primary care facilities (dispensaries and health 
centres) were eliminated,12 and FP services are intended 
to be provided for free at public facilities.14 15 The extent 
to which users currently receive free FP services from 
public outpatient primary care facilities is unknown, and 
similar to the 10/20 policy, implementation of the June 
2013 policy for free FP services may vary, for example, by 
facility type, geographic region or client characteristics.
Efforts to achieve universal coverage for reproductive 
health have led to increasing calls by donors and others 
for a ‘total market approach’ in considering the different 
contributions of public and private providers. In this 
approach, government-subsidised or otherwise subsidised 
services are targeted to meet the needs of the poor while 
individuals with the ability to pay are indirectly encour-
aged to seek FP services from commercial or unsubsidised 
private providers.3 5 16 17 Kenya’s changing fee policies 
within the public sector and the country’s growing private 
sector, which now owns half of all health facilities,12 raise 
questions about where individuals, especially the poor, 
seek FP and what this means for their OOP payment 
for modern contraception. Little is known about OOP 
payment to obtain modern contraception in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and in Kenya in particular, and how this varies 
by provider type. In the context of limited resources to 
expand FP access,18 it is important to understand the 
burden of user fees—who pays and how much—and the 
degree to which vulnerable groups are served by current 
efforts to provide affordable care.
This paper aims to address these knowledge gaps by 
describing FP sources by user’s wealth in Kenya, exam-
ining, among public sector users, who receives free FP 
services, and comparing how payment for injectables 
and implants—the two most commonly used methods—
differs by FP provider type and the user’s sociodemo-
graphic characteristics.
MethODs
Data source
We used data from the most recent Kenya DHS (2014), 
a nationally representative, cross-sectional household 
survey of women age 15–49 years with a multilevel cluster 
sampling design. A detailed description of the survey 
sampling can be found in the DHS report.19 Interviews 
were administered between May and October 2014. Our 
analysis includes women in half of the randomly selected 
households who were administered the long-version 
Woman’s Questionnaire (unweighted n=14 741), which 
included a question on the amount paid for the respon-
dent’s current contraceptive method.19 Respondents 
were not asked for the reason for the payment.
study populations
We examined data from three populations of women: 
(1) current users of modern contraception, based on the 
Hubacher and Trussell definition of modern methods20; 
(2) users of intrauterine device (IUD), implant, inject-
able, pill and male condom as these users were asked to 
self-report the total amount paid to obtain their method 
(the combined cost of the commodity and any consulta-
tion fees) during their most recent (re)supply visit and 
(3) users of injectable and implant, where estimates of 
OOP payment refer to a single quantity of the contracep-
tive, as users can receive only one ‘dose’ during insertion 
or resupply. Respondents with missing or ‘do not know’ 
expenditure values accounted for 4.4% of all users in 
group two, and <1% of injectable and implant users, and 
were excluded from analysis.
Definitions
We classified women’s self-reported most recent 
source of modern FP into seven provider catego-
ries: 1) government hospital; 2) government health 
centre; 3) government dispensary; 4) private facility, a 
constructed category comprising DHS response options 
of private hospital/clinic and private nursing/mater-
nity home; 5) non-governmental organisation (NGO)/
faith-based facility; 6) pharmacy/chemist and 7) other, 
a constructed category of the response options: shop, 
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mobile clinic, friend/relative, other, community health 
worker, community-based distributor and other private 
medical. We defined the public sector to be govern-
ment-provided services (categories 1–3) and non-public 
providers to be categories 4–7. We consider public 
primary care providers to be categories 2 and 3. Less 
than 1% of all current modern contraceptive users were 
missing the source of their method and were excluded 
from analysis.
We examined three measures of the respondents’ 
socioeconomic status: household wealth quintiles derived 
by the DHS from household assets,21 urban/rural resi-
dence and three levels of educational attainment: less 
than primary school (respondents with no education 
and those who started but did not complete primary 
school), less than secondary school (respondents with 
complete primary or incomplete secondary school) and 
secondary+ (respondents with complete secondary or 
some higher education). We used DHS categories for 
respondent’s current marital status (never, currently or 
formerly in union) and grouped respondents by their 
current age: <20, 20–29 and 30+ years. Kenya is admin-
istratively divided into 47 counties; however, the variable 
for OOP payment for contraception in the 2014 Kenya 
DHS was intended to provide representative estimates for 
the national level, for urban and rural areas and for the 
eight regions (former provinces).19
Analysis of free or ‘registration fee only’ FP in the public 
sector
We limited analysis of free FP to users whose most recent 
source of the method was a public sector provider. We 
include both categories of public primary care providers 
(subject to the June 2013 abolishment of fees) and govern-
ment hospitals as a point of comparison. Adjusted Wald 
tests were performed to compare proportions reporting 
free FP by facility type and user characteristics. Bivari-
able and multivariable logistic regression was used to 
examine predictors, such as wealth quintile, facility type 
and region, of receiving free FP from public primary care 
facilities, as indicated under the 2013 policy.
Users of long-acting methods like IUD and implant 
could report OOP payment based on FP consultations 
before the June 2013 abolishment of fees. Thus, estimates 
of free FP for IUD and implant were further disaggre-
gated by whether the method was obtained before or 
after June 2013 based on the respondent’s self-reported 
month and year of initiating use of the method.
Facility-level implementation of the June 2013 policy 
abolishing all fees at public primary care facilities may 
not have been immediate. As such, we additionally exam-
ined the proportion of users who reported paying up to 
10 KES or 20 KES at a government dispensary or health 
centre, respectively, referring to these users as paying 
‘registration fees only’ consistent with the former 10/20 
policy, although respondents did not indicate the reason 
for the charge.
Analysis of OOP payment for injectable and implant
Prior to analysis, we assessed the data for improbable 
values and recoded observations to missing if reported 
expenditure was >10 times the 95th percentile (six obser-
vations). Among injectable and implant users reporting 
non-zero cost, we described the patterns of OOP expen-
diture, reporting mean and median values. We conducted 
sensitivity analyses to ensure the robustness of our results, 
comparing results from multiple methods for dealing with 
outliers22; results did not differ substantially (online supple-
mentary table 1). For this analysis, observations >2 SD from 
the mean (2.7% and 2.1% of injectable and implant users, 
respectively) were recoded to be equal to the mean. Simple 
linear regression and marginal effects were used to compare 
means between providers and user characteristics. We addi-
tionally present estimates of OOP payment converted from 
KES to US dollars based on 1 KES to US$0.0114 conversion 
rate for the midpoint of fieldwork in July 201423 (online 
supplementary tables 1–2).
Equity of OOP payment for injectable and implant
Quintile ratios were used to measure the progressiveness 
of OOP payments for injectables and implants overall 
and within the public sector. This measure of equity in 
expenditure assumes that individuals in the lowest wealth 
quintile have less capacity to pay and thus if they spend 
the same or more as those in the highest quintile, this 
represents a greater proportion of income and consti-
tutes regressive spending.24 Quintile ratios were calcu-
lated by comparing mean expenditure in the wealthiest 
and poorest wealth quintiles and testing for differences 
using an adjusted Wald-type test of non-linear hypotheses 
based on the delta method, attributing significance at 
a 95% confidence level.4 24 25 We define expenditure as 
weakly pro-rich if there was no significant difference in 
mean payment between the poorest and wealthiest users 
and strongly pro-rich if the poorest users paid significantly 
more than the wealthiest users (quintile ratio <1).4 24
All analysis used women’s individual sampling weights 
and SE adjustment to account for complex survey design. 
Analyses were conducted in Stata/SE V.14 (StataCorp, 
College Station, Texas, USA).
Patient and public involvement statement
Patients and the public were not involved in this secondary 
data analysis.
results
A total of 5717 (weighted n) modern contraceptive users 
with non-missing provider data were included in our anal-
ysis sample.
Methods and sources of family planning
Among all current modern FP users, the wealthiest quin-
tile had the broadest mix of methods, with no single 
method accounting for more than a third of modern FP 
users (figure 1A). In contrast, method mix among users 
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in the three poorer quintiles was dominated by inject-
ables, which accounted for more than half of methods 
used. While injectables and implants were the two most 
popular methods for all users, this was particularly true 
for the poorest users, where these two methods accounted 
for nearly 80% of all modern methods used.
The wealthiest contraceptive users also reported a 
broader mix of providers (figure 1B). Among the poorest 
users, 80.0% reported a public sector source. Public 
provider use decreased steadily and use of private facil-
ities and pharmacies increased with increasing wealth 
quintile. The wealthiest users reported the largest use of 
private facilities (30.5%) and pharmacies (18.7%). Among 
injectable users, public sector providers were the most-
used source for the three poorest quintiles, with a clear 
decline in government dispensary use with increasing 
wealth (figure 1C). The vast majority of implants in the 
four poorer wealth quintiles were sourced from public 
providers, and there was a dramatic increase in use of 
private facilities for implants in the fifth, wealthiest quin-
tile (online supplementary table 3 shows the distribution 
of all modern methods by provider type).
Free family planning
Users of injectable, implant, pill, condom and IUD were 
asked to self-report the total amount paid to obtain their 
method. Overall, 51.1% of public sector users reported 
obtaining their modern FP method for free at their most 
recent visit (table 1). This varied by method used: >90% 
of condom users compared with 40.7% of injectable users 
reported free FP. Across the three levels of facilities, 50.1% 
of government hospital, 56.2% of government health centre 
and 48.5% of government dispensary users reported free FP, 
with some evidence of a difference by facility type (p=0.048). 
The percentage of women obtaining free FP in public facil-
ities differed only slightly by respondent’s wealth quintile, 
urban/rural residence, education level or age group. The 
proportion of users reporting free FP varied considerably 
by region, with 39.4% of Rift Valley residents compared 
with 76.6% of Nairobi residents reporting free contracep-
tion. Additionally, 1.3% (95% CI: 0.9% to 2.1%) of users 
of government health centres and dispensaries reported 
paying a ‘registration fee only’ amount under the former 
10/20 policy (results not shown). There was no difference 
by user’s wealth quintile.
Among non-public sector providers (results not shown), 
10.9% of private facility users and <1% of pharmacy users 
reported free FP. Of the limited number of users of NGO/
faith-based facilities (n=91), 30.9% reported obtaining 
their contraceptive method for free.
Online supplementary table 4 shows the proportion 
of IUD and implant users receiving free FP from public 
sector providers among users initiating the method before 
and after the June 2013 fee abolishment. Among implant 
users, the proportion receiving free FP from government 
Figure 1 Method mix and provider use by wealth quintile among current modern family planning (FP) users.
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health centres was similar between the two initiation 
periods and increased in the later period among users 
of government hospitals and dispensaries, although CIs 
overlap. Among IUD users, the proportion receiving free 
care was slightly lower across all three public provider 
categories in the later initiation period, but differences 
were not statistically significant.
Table 2 shows the results of bivariable and multivariable 
analysis of receiving free modern FP among users of public 
primary care facilities, which were subject to the June 2013 
fee abolishment policy. There were no differences by wealth 
quintile in the odds of obtaining free contraception after 
adjusting for method, provider type and user characteristics. 
Users of implants, condoms, pills and IUDs were all more 
likely to report receiving their method for free (p<0.001) 
compared with injectable users, and this relationship 
remained after adjusting for provider and user characteris-
tics. Users in all regions had lower odds of free contracep-
tion compared with Nairobi, except Coast region (where it 
was not significantly different).
Table 1 Among public sector providers, proportion reporting free family planning by modern method users’ 
sociodemographic characteristics
Government hospital
(n=929) 
Government health 
centre
(n=815) 
Government 
dispensary
(n=1267) 
Total public
(n=3011) 
Overall (95% CI) 50.1 (45.9 to 54.3) 56.2 (50.9 to 61.4) 48.5 (45.0 to 52.1) 51.1 (48.5 to 53.7)
Method
  Injectable 38.4 (32.4 to 44.8) 46.0 (39.3 to 52.9) 39.2 (34.8 to 43.7) 40.7 (37.5 to 44.1)
  Implant 55.0 (47.1 to 62.6) 63.0 (53.9 to 71.1) 61.5 (54.6 to 67.9) 59.6 (54.8 to 64.2)
  Pill 68.7 (53.8 to 80.6) 66.0 (50.6 to 78.6) 61.1 (50.0 to 71.3) 64.7 (57.1 to 71.6)
  Condom 90.8 (71.0 to 97.5) 92.8 (77.4 to 98.0) 97.4 (83.7 to 99.6) 93.6 (85.0 to 97.3)
  Intrauterine device 49.6 (38.6 to 60.7) 75.4 (57.8 to 87.3) 73.4 (57.1 to 85.1) 60.7 (52.8 to 68.1)
Wealth quintile
  Poorest 61.7 (48.7 to 73.1) 54.1 (41.3 to 66.5) 46.1 (39.2 to 53.1) 50.2 (44.4 to 55.9)
  Poor 51.2 (41.0 to 61.4) 51.7 (42.2 to 61.1) 44.3 (38.4 to 50.4) 47.6 (43.0 to 52.3)
  Middle 43.2 (35.5 to 51.2) 52.4 (42.6 to 62.0) 48.9 (41.3 to 56.5) 48.6 (43.6 to 53.7)
  Wealthy 51.8 (43.6 to 60.0) 57.1 (47.3 to 66.3) 54.4 (45.9 to 62.7) 54.2 (48.6 to 59.7)
  Wealthiest 49.6 (42.0 to 57.2) 66.9 (55.0 to 76.9) 53.9 (39.8 to 67.4) 54.9 (48.7 to 61.0)
Residence
  Urban 49.1 (43.6 to 54.7) 66.0 (56.8 to 74.2) 56.1 (47.6 to 64.3) 55.2 (50.6 to 59.7)
  Rural 51.6 (45.1 to 58.0) 50.9 (44.7 to 57.0) 46.8 (42.9 to 50.7) 48.8 (45.8 to 51.9)
Educational attainment
  Less than primary 56.7 (48.3 to 64.7) 55.1 (47.0 to 62.9) 47.6 (42.5 to 52.6) 51.7 (47.8 to 55.6)
  Less than secondary 46.0 (40.0 to 52.0) 56.6 (49.3 to 63.6) 48.9 (43.8 to 53.9) 49.9 (46.4 to 53.5)
  Secondary+ 51.3 (43.0 to 59.4) 57.1 (46.9 to 66.6) 49.8 (40.9 to 58.7) 52.5 (47.0 to 58.0)
Age group (years)
  <20 41.3 (19.4 to 67.4) 61.3 (40.2 to 78.9) 60.4 (42.8 to 75.7) 55.4 (43.4 to 66.9)
  20–29 45.8 (40.0 to 51.7) 55.3 (48.1 to 62.4) 42.9 (37.9 to 48.1) 47.0 (43.5 to 50.6)
  30+ 54.2 (48.0 to 60.3) 56.5 (49.8 to 63.0) 52.7 (47.8 to 57.5) 54.2 (50.7 to 57.7)
Region*
  Central 53.1 (43.5 to 62.4) 64.0 (50.7 to 75.4) 60.2 (47.8 to 71.4) 58.6 (51.3 to 65.5)
  Coast 70.3 (58.9 to 79.7) 81.2 (69.6 to 89.0) 62.4 (52.4 to 71.4) 69.1 (62.1 to 75.2)
  Eastern 35.2 (26.3 to 45.2) 40.4 (29.5 to 52.3) 44.5 (36.9 to 52.4) 41.5 (36.0 to 47.2)
  Nairobi 70.4 (54.1 to 82.7) 76.0 (55.3 to 89.0) −† 76.6 (63.4 to 86.0)
  Nyanza 59.4 (49.8 to 68.3) 55.6 (44.2 to 66.4) 37.0 (30.0 to 44.7) 49.0 (43.1 to 55.0)
  Rift Valley 30.9 (24.2 to 38.5) 48.0 (37.3 to 58.9) 42.8 (36.7 to 49.1) 39.4 (35.1 to 43.8)
  Western 60.1 (43.6 to 74.5) 46.6 (34.2 to 59.4) 50.0 (39.8 to 60.3) 50.6 (43.5 to 57.7)
*Due to the very low modern contraceptive prevalence (<5%), results for the North Eastern region are not presented.
†No respondents reported this provider.
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Out-of-pocket payment for injectables and implants
Among injectable and implant users reporting greater 
than zero OOP payment to obtain the method from 
their most recent provider (both sectors combined), the 
mean cost was KES 80 (US$0.91) (95% CI: KES 78 to 82) 
for injectable and KES 378 (US$4.31) (95% CI: KES 
327 to 429) for implant (table 3); 1.7% of injectable and 
1.5% of implant users reported paying amounts consis-
tent with registration fees only (<KES 20). OOP payment 
varied, particularly for implant, by source of the method, 
with some private facility users reporting very high costs. 
Injectable users of public sector providers reported 
a median cost of KES 50, whereas the median cost was 
twice that (KES 100) for those accessing private facilities 
or pharmacies. Among implant users, those accessing 
public sector sources reported a median cost of KES 200, 
compared with a median cost of KES 503 among those 
using private facilities.
When assessed by user characteristics, mean OOP 
payment for both injectables and implants varied 
significantly by user’s wealth, residence, education level 
and region, but not by user’s age (table 4). Urban and 
Nairobi residents paid more for both methods; this was 
particularly notable for implant users in Nairobi, where 
mean cost was more than twice that of implant users in 
Western or Nyanza regions. Mean and median cost did 
not increase linearly with increasing wealth quintile. For 
injectable users, median cost in the poorest three quin-
tiles was KES 70 compared with KES 100 in the two wealth-
iest quintiles. For implant users, median cost of KES 500 
in the wealthiest quintile was more than twice the median 
cost of KES 200 in the four poorer quintiles. The overall 
quintile ratio for all providers comparing mean cost in 
the wealthiest quintile with the poorest quintile was 1.3 
(p<0.001) for injectable and 1.8 (p=0.007) for implant, 
indicating strong evidence of pro-poor OOP payment for 
both methods. Among public sector users, the quintile 
ratio was 1.2 (p=0.033) for injectable indicating pro-poor 
expenditure, and 0.90 (p=0.660) for implant (table 5), 
indicating weakly pro-rich expenditure (no difference 
in mean cost between the quintiles) for public sector 
implant users.
DisCussiOn
This is the first study to our knowledge to use nationally 
representative household data from an LMIC to examine 
equity of OOP payment for FP, comparing differences in 
cost with users accessing public and non-public providers. 
The wealthiest FP users in Kenya used a greater mix of 
modern methods and providers compared with the 
poorest users, and use of non-public providers increased 
with increasing wealth. Despite Kenya’s national policy 
to offer free FP services at public primary care facilities, 
we found only half of modern method users reported 
obtaining their method at no cost from government 
providers, with little variation by facility type. There were 
no differences by user’s socioeconomic position. Among 
injectable and implant users reporting OOP expendi-
ture, there were considerable differences by source of the 
method. Consistent with a previous study of FP users in 
urban Kenya,26 we found private facility and pharmacy 
Table 2 Unadjusted and adjusted ORs from logistic 
regression analysis of reporting free family planning services 
from government primary care providers among modern 
method users
Variables
Modern method users using public primary 
care providers (n=2079)
Unadjusted Adjusted
OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)
Wealth quintile
  Poorest 0.58* (0.37 to 0.91) 1.10 (0.64 to 1.91)
  Poor 0.55** (0.36 to 0.85) 1.20 (0.71 to 2.03)
  Middle 0.64* (0.41 to 0.99) 1.25 (0.74 to 2.11)
  Wealthy 0.79 (0.51 to 1.24) 1.16 (0.67 to 2.01)
  Wealthiest Ref Ref
Provider
  Government health 
centre Ref Ref
  Government 
dispensary 0.74* (0.57 to 0.95) 0.95 (0.74 to 1.22)
Method
  Injectable Ref Ref
  Implant 2.32*** (1.78 to 3.02) 2.15*** (1.62 to 2.86)
  Condom 29.87*** (9.84 to 90.66)
35.29*** (11.42 to 
109.05)
  Pill 2.39*** (1.63 to 3.52) 2.27*** 1.56 to 3.28)
  Intrauterine device 4.14*** (2.26 to 7.56) 3.90*** (2.06 to 7.36)
Residence
  Urban Ref Ref
  Rural 0.58*** (0.43 to 0.79) 0.83 (0.60 to 1.14)
Region
  Central 0.36* (0.14 to 0.93) 0.31* (0.10 to 0.93)
  Coast 0.48 (0.18 to 1.24) 0.53 (0.19 to 1.53)
  Eastern 0.17*** (0.07 to 0.42) 0.18** (0.06 to 0.52)
  Nairobi Ref Ref
  Nyanza 0.18*** (0.07 to 0.44) 0.17** (0.06 to 0.50)
  Rift Valley 0.17*** (0.07 to 0.43) 0.19** (0.07 to 0.53)
  Western 0.21** (0.08 to 0.53) 0.21** (0.07 to 0.62)
Age group (years)
  <20 1.31 (0.75 to 2.28) 1.58 (0.85 to 2.92)
  20–29 0.76* (0.61 to 0.95) 0.85 (0.67 to 1.08)
  30+ Ref Ref
Marital status
  Never in union 0.93 (0.62 to 1.40) 0.80 (0.47 to 1.36)
  Currently in union Ref Ref
  Formerly in union 1.38† (0.96 to 1.98) 1.27 (0.88 to 1.83)
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (differences between the category and the 
reference category are significant).
†p<0.1 (differences between the category and the reference category are 
marginally significant).
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users, unsurprisingly, reported higher expenditures 
than users of public facilities. Unfortunately, due to very 
small sample sizes (<30 users), OOP payment by users 
of NGO/faith-based facilities remains unclear, although 
there is some indication that costs may be higher than 
among public sector providers. Greater use of higher 
cost, non-public providers by the wealthiest users contrib-
uted to overall pro-poor expenditure, with both inject-
able and implant users in the wealthiest quintile paying 
significantly more than their counterparts in the poorest 
quintile.
A ‘total market approach’ to FP includes efforts to 
target government subsidies to the poorest contracep-
tive users and indirectly nudge wealthier users to seek 
FP from non-public providers. Evidence from this study 
suggests that market forces appear to be working to 
encourage greater use of non-public providers by the 
wealthiest users, although nearly 40% of FP users in the 
wealthiest quintile still sourced their method from the 
public sector. However, while the poorest users obtained 
their methods overwhelmingly from public providers they 
were equally likely to pay for FP as users in the wealthiest 
quintile, suggesting the potential for better targeting of 
free services to ensure the national pro-poor strategy of 
removing user fees for FP in public primary care facilities 
is reaching recipients most in need.
The Kenyan government faces the challenge of both 
meeting targets to reduce unmet need for FP14 and 
ensuring all women, including the poor, have choice in 
FP methods and providers. Recent attempts to expand 
access to long-term methods, like implants, in Kenya have 
focused on expanding the range of providers available 
to the poor through vouchers. In 2005, Kenya launched 
a pilot system in five districts that enabled individuals 
below the poverty threshold to purchase vouchers for 
long-term or permanent contraceptive methods, which 
could be redeemed at a variety of public, private for-profit 
and private not-for-profit providers.27 The FP voucher 
programme received criticism concerning the limited 
uptake of the scheme2 28 and lack of demand genera-
tion activities. Some also suggested that the FP voucher 
fee of KES 100 (approximately US$1.25) was still rela-
tively costly for the poorest users,3 although this is half 
the reported median cost (KES 200) for implant in the 
public sector in our study. Studies in Kenya have found 
many women express a preference for or high satisfac-
tion with FP services at private sector facilities.29–31 Initia-
tives to expand the range of affordable providers offering 
high-quality care and a range of contraceptives are still 
important components of ensuring FP access and choice.
Respondent’s region was significantly associated with 
differences in reporting free FP and the amount paid 
Table 3 Summary of out-of-pocket payment (in KES) for injectable and implant users among users with non-zero expenditure, 
by most recent provider of the contraceptive method
Government 
hospital
Government 
health centre
Government 
dispensary Total public
Private 
facility
NGO/
faith-based 
facility
Pharmacy/
chemist Other* Total
Injectable
  n 247 225 490 962 821 28 148 17 1976
  Mean cost KES 72 KES 66 KES 63 KES 66 KES 94 KES 75 KES 95 KES 93 KES 80
  SD 33.38 28.37 28.78 30.10 24.33 26.37 24.42 24.56 30.63
  25th percentile KES 50 KES 50 KES 50 KES 50 KES 80 KES 50 KES 80 KES 100 KES 50
  50th percentile 
(median)
KES 50 KES 50 KES 50 KES 50 KES 100 KES 70 KES 100 KES 100 KES 100
  75th percentile KES 100 KES 100 KES 100 KES 100 KES 100 KES 87 KES 100 KES 100 KES 100
  Reporting 
registration fees 
only
7.5% 5.3% 0.8% 3.6% 1.7%
Implant
  n 136 94 102 332 130 11 – 3 477
  Mean cost KES 305 KES 255 KES 208 KES 261 KES 655 KES 564 KES 544 KES 378
  SD 295.01 221.51 142.92 238.98 441.62 388.58 534.17 359.25
  25th percentile KES 200 KES 100 KES 100 KES 100 KES 300 KES 200 KES 100 KES 200
  50th percentile 
(median)
KES 200 KES 200 KES 200 KES 200 KES 503 KES 800 KES 100 KES 200
  75th percentile KES 300 KES 300 KES 200 KES 300 KES 1000 KES 800 KES 1000 KES 500
  Reporting 
registration fees 
only
1.7% 5.0% 0.0% 2.1% 1.5%
*Includes Demographic and Health Survey response options: mobile clinic and other private medical.
1 KES=US$0.0114. 
KES, Kenyan shillings; NGO, non-governmental organisation.
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for injectable and implant. In 2010, Kenya’s Ministry of 
Health devolved decision-making power and budgets 
to the county level, although policy continued to be set 
at the national level.32 Despite recent gains in national 
modern contraceptive prevalence and reduction of 
unmet need, large regional disparities in coverage 
remain.19 Differences in regional levels of free FP, with 
a substantially higher proportion of users in Nairobi 
reporting free FP compared with nearly all other regions, 
suggest that counties may be operating different systems 
of payment for contraception or distribution channels for 
FP commodities. Public primary care facilities in Kenya 
have long faced challenges of resource scarcity.33 As 
public primary care facilities cannot directly charge for 
FP under the current policy, when faced with declining 
revenue, they may introduce indirect charges, framed 
as registration fees or other costs, to recoup expenses.11 
Efforts to reimburse primary care facilities to account for 
the abolishment of user fees have been at relatively low 
levels, and as our findings also show, user fees above those 
set in national policy continue to be charged.33 Further 
research is needed to understand subnational implemen-
tation of the national FP policy, the impact of facility-level 
strategies to cope with financial shortfalls on user’s access 
to care and the reasons users are charged for contracep-
tive services.
The considerable variation in free services by method 
in public facilities possibly reflects differing auxiliary costs 
associated with dispensing methods, with, for example, 
more staff time, training and medical equipment required 
to insert IUDs and implants compared with condoms, 
which are often available without a consultation. We 
found that injectable users were significantly less likely 
to report receiving this method for free compared with 
long-acting IUD and implants or even the pill, raising 
questions about the long-term cost burden to users, who 
require resupply every 3 months for continued coverage, 
for this popular method.
limitations
This study was limited in relying on the accuracy of 
women’s self-report of their method, source and cost of 
FP. While current injectable users needed to recall how 
much was paid up to 3 months earlier, some current 
implant users were asked to report the amount paid up 
to 3 years prior to interview, although median length 
of implant use was <17 months. Additionally, we were 
only able to consider cost and source among women 
who were current users of FP. Findings are likely not 
generalisable to former implant or injectable users, 
particularly if they discontinued due to costs associated 
with obtaining their method of choice, or to prospec-
tive users who were discouraged from initiating FP due 
to costs associated.
The DHS question regarding contraceptive cost asked 
for the total paid for commodity and consultation, and 
it did not capture costs associated with time and travel 
to obtain the method. These may be significant, particu-
larly for rural users. We were unable to estimate the share 
of OOP payment for FP from total income because the 
DHS does not collect information on household/indi-
vidual income or expenditures. As such, we cannot draw 
conclusions about the extent to which the amount paid 
for FP represents an undue burden on individual users. 
Additionally, DHS household wealth quintiles may not 
align with the poverty definition used to determine FP 
fee waivers or offer sufficient nuance to distinguish very 
disadvantaged households.34
We acknowledge that the first consultation visit to 
initiate the contraceptive method may be longer, involving 
counselling and taking of medical history, than a resupply 
visit and could result in increased cost. However, we 
compared results for initiators, users starting injectable 
and implant <3 months and 3 years, respectively, before 
the survey where the cost paid likely refers to the initi-
ating consultation, against resupply users, those starting 
the method >3 months or 3 years prior to interview. Yet we 
found initiating users reported slightly lower mean costs 
Table 5 Out-of-pocket (OOP) payment (in KES) for public sector injectable and implant among users with non-zero 
expenditure by wealth quintile
Wealth quintile 
Injectable Implant
n
Mean
(95% CI) Quintile ratio* n Mean (95% CI) Quintile ratio*
Poorest 147 KES 65 (59 to 72) 27 KES 267 (146 to 389)
Poor 247 KES 61 (57 to 65) 76 KES 231 (200 to 262)
Middle 256 KES 66 (62 to 70) 68 KES 253 (205 to 301)
Wealthy 197 KES 66 (61 to 72) 78 KES 317 (187 to 447)
Wealthiest 116 KES 78 (69 to 87) 1.2 (p=0.033) 82 KES 240 (190 to 291) 0.90 (p=0.660)
*Ratio of mean OOP expenditure comparing the wealthiest users with the poorest users. Adjusted Wald-type test based on the delta method 
was used to test for significance.
1 KES=US$0.0114.
KES, Kenyan shillings. 
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than resuppliers, although differences were not signifi-
cant (results not shown).
Finally, FP budget implementation is done at the 
county-level in Kenya, yet the DHS FP cost question was 
intended to be representative at national, urban/rural 
and regional levels only19 and thus county-level results 
could not be examined.
COnClusiOns
Removing or subsidising costs for the poor is a core 
component of an equitable system of user fees for health-
care, yet our findings highlight that the poorest contracep-
tive users in the public sector were as likely to pay for FP 
services as wealthier users. Kenya’s National Reproductive 
Health Strategy (2009–2015) outlined pro-poor strategies 
and objectives to increase equity of FP access. The Kenyan 
government has made important progress in expanding 
FP access but more attention is needed for implementa-
tion of user fee policies, particularly to ensure the poorest 
receive affordable services and to account for geographic 
variation, ensuring recent efforts to reimburse facilities 
for lost user fee revenue are done at appropriate levels. 
However, public sector resources alone are unlikely to 
meet Kenya’s growing demand for modern contracep-
tion. Policymakers should consider how government 
resources could be targeted at those least able to tap the 
private sector for FP care. While individual price discrimi-
nation offers one route to targeting public services to the 
poor, efforts could also focus on resources—including 
outreach campaigns about patients’ rights and correct 
fees—towards facilities in poor areas or towards increasing 
choice of affordable methods and accessible, high-quality 
providers for the poor. Fulfilling the promise of equity in 
FP access in Kenya demands turning policy intention into 
sustainable action from the national to facility level.
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